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THE FUTURE OF THE FUTURE: KOYRÉ, KOJÈVE, AND 
MALABOU SPECULATE ON HEGELIAN TIME
Rory Jeffs
… will there and can there be a future after the supposed end of history…. beyond ‘absolute 
knowledge’?
— Jacques Derrida1
The relationship between Hegel’s speculative idealist philosophy and time has a long and complicated history. 
Since his death in 1831, Hegel’s name has inspired a range of interpretations and speculations about what his 
philosophy entails. In 1946, the Russian-born French Hegelian Alexandre Kojève speculated: 
[I]t may be that, in fact the future of the world, and therefore the meaning of the present and the 
significance of the past, depend, in the final analysis, on the way in which the Hegelian writings are 
interpreted today.2 
Half a century later as we entered the twenty-first century, Catherine Malabou speculated that the future of 
Hegel depended on how we read the future in Hegel’s philosophy.3 And more recently, Slavoj Žižek in his own 
typically speculative manner, claimed that even after decades of anti-Hegelian sentiment and a wilful forgetting 
of Hegel, “Hegel’s century will be the twenty-first.”4 On the surface, such statements seem to place undue 
importance on Hegel and may confirm the conventional suspicion of him as an all-encompassing philosopher. 
However, there is also the implication that the future itself, or to loosely paraphrase Malabou, “the future of 
the future” is what is at stake. Hegel’s value then would be to act as a guide to working out and potentially 
saving the time of the future itself from insignificance, repetition, or a “levelling down”.5 Žižek may have also 
intimated something, that Hegel’s time, or future, is yet-to-come—which raises the question of what could 
have delayed Hegel’s true arrival? I will examine in this article one possible response to such a question that 
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concerns how the riddle of Hegelian temporality plagued the twentieth-century French reading of Hegel. French 
Hegelianism has a reputation for its creative and “idiomatic” use of Hegel’s philosophy, and this has been both 
its strength and its weakness.6 From the 1930s onwards though, the French reading of Hegel had difficulty with 
fully comprehending the nature and role of the Hegelian System. As a result, it was often avoided, or turned 
into a strategic target and foil for anti-Hegelianism—with Hegel projected as a totalitarian thinker and enemy 
of difference and existence itself. I will argue that one element that played a part in cultivating this rejection is 
the issue of temporality and its place within such a System. This issue comes down to not only whether there 
is a future-oriented temporality (i.e. futurity) latent within Hegel’s System, but as Malabou demonstrates, 
how Hegel’s System calls on us to continually engage with it. This article selectively focuses on the writings 
of Alexandre Koyré, Alexandre Kojève, and Catherine Malabou, who, despite their differences, bring to the 
fore the importance of the question of Hegelian temporality, and as a result, directly pursue this question of 
the future in Hegel’s philosophy—and what effect it has on the future of Hegel. One of the key problems 
discussed in this article is the dualistic hermeneutic taken to Hegel’s work by Koyré and Kojève—who both 
distinguish the writings of the early Jena-period Hegel with their primacy of the future from the later Hegel of 
the Encyclopaedia with its assumed primacy of the past. The article will end with a discussion of Malabou’s 
interpretation and test whether it brings a productive traversal of the troubling implications exposed by Koyré’s 
and Kojève’s reading of Hegel.
The influence of Heidegger’s phenomenological approach to temporality and his critique of Hegel linger 
heavily in the background of Koyré, Kojève’s and Malabou’s analyses and cannot be underestimated. 
Heidegger’s briefly discussed, but effective identification of Hegel’s concept of time with homogenous time 
served as one of the threads in the overall critique of Hegel throughout the twentieth century. Heidegger’s 
key engagement with Hegel’s work resides in Section 82 of Being and Time, from where it has, as Jacques 
Derrida discusses, gathered “universal currency” and imparted the suspicion that in Hegel, the “future itself 
is finished!”7 Heidegger claimed Hegel had cast “little light… on the source of time,” because he remained 
trapped by a “vulgar” metaphysical conception of time predicated on a series of discrete “nows”—the future 
in this case, being merely a not-yet “now”.8 Heidegger considered then Hegel no more sophisticated than 
Aristotle on this question of temporality, only differing in that he brought this determination of “nows” to 
completion.9 The source of much of Heidegger’s critique of Hegel’s concept of temporality is drawn from the 
‘Mechanics’ section of the Encyclopaedia version of the Philosophy of Nature, where Hegel had said there is 
no “stable” difference between past and future in nature.10 Heidegger’s own phenomenological account of the 
“ek-static” structure of time differs in that as a “being-toward-death”, Dasein experiences a concrete sense of 
its own finitude and is exposed to what Heidegger calls “primordial time”. The sense of a future is inseparable 
from the sense of our own mortality. We do not anticipate the future passively as a “now” that is not-yet 
actual, but resolutely as that which is “coming [Kunft]”. Hence, I would argue Heidegger’s own existential 
analytic of time articulates itself thus: “The primary meaning of existence is the future”.11 From this point of 
view, Heidegger ends up arguing: “‘Spirit’ does not first fall into time,” as assumed by Hegel, “but it exists as 
the primordial temporalizing of temporality.”12 During his 1930–31 lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit, 
Heidegger reinforced his line, arguing “Hegel occasionally speaks about having been [i.e. the past], but never 
about the future”. Accordingly, the “past” in the Hegelian framework becomes “the decisive character of time.” 
For these reasons, Heidegger says that Hegel bids “farewell to time” in favour of knowing the “immutable” 
being, and as a result, deals with the problem of finitude as an “incidental” moment in the dialectic.13 It is in 
this post-Heideggerian context that Koyré and Kojève approached the issue of Hegel and temporality. They 
were the first “Hegelians” in France to respond to Heidegger’s philosophy in a direct way, acknowledging the 
greatness and originality of Being and Time—but also raising the prospect that there was a more concrete sense 
of futurity in Hegel’s philosophy that bore resemblance to Heidegger’s. 
 
THE “PRIMACY OF THE FUTURE”: KOYRÉ’S DISCOVERY OF THE YOUNG 
HEGEL
Koyré and Kojève were two Russian émigrés who arrived in Paris in the 1920s via the phenomenological 
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heartland of Weimer Republic Germany. Koyré had been trained under Edmund Husserl at Göttingen, and 
Kojève by Karl Jaspers at Heidelberg. For his part, Koyré had been a key player in igniting the French Hegel 
Renaissance along with Jean Wahl in the late 1920s. Neo-Kantianism and Bergsonism dominated the French 
académie during this time, but for Koyré, they were “not able to answer the burning questions of the day.”14 
Koyré found Hegel to be a more “concrete” philosopher, but believed that in order to bring him back after 
a hundred-year “exile” from French scholarship; one would have to merge him with the phenomenological 
tradition marked out of Heidegger and Husserl. To do so though, he would have to class Hegel as the progenitor 
of the phenomenological method itself in spite of Heidegger’s own misgivings and the distance he created 
between himself and Hegel.15 
The event that gave impetus to Koyré’s project of reinventing Hegel was the publication of the Jena manuscripts, 
first by Georg Lasson in 1923, then by Johannes Hoffmeister in the early 1930s.16 Along with the publication 
of Herman Nohl’s edition of Hegel’s Early Theological Writings in 1907, the posthumously published Jena 
manuscripts were a breakthrough for Hegelian scholarship in that they revealed the man behind the system 
and Hegel’s “philosophical apprenticeship”. Koyré thought these manuscripts would help scholars get past the 
difficult and opaque language of the later writings. Koyré’s main article on Hegel and temporality was ‘Hegel 
à Jena’, which was in part a summary of his own 1932–33 Course on ‘The Religious Philosophy of Hegel’ 
at École pratique des hautes études.17 Koyré proposed that Hegel dealt with phenomenological and historical 
problems during his formative Jena period (1801–06), and his “ultimate ambition was to dialectically unite rest 
with movement and to connect time to eternity by his notion of timeless becoming [devenir intemporel].”18 He 
considered Hegel’s path of thought during these years could be encapsulated by the phrase, “Geist ist Zeit”, 
which Hegel had written in a marginal note to one of the incomplete manuscripts of the period.19 A major part 
of Koyré’s article is based on a translation, commentary, and comparison of two versions of Hegel’s Jena 
Philosophy of Nature—in the Jenenser Logic (1804–05) and the Jenenser Realphilosophie II (1805-06).20 What 
Koyré finds uniquely distinctive in these Jena manuscripts is something rather “esoteric” lies within them, that 
Hegel proposes a radically phenomenological account of time as the “restlessness [Unruhe]” of the infinite 
Spirit and at the heart of being itself. Koyré singles out Hegel’s use of the word “Unruhe”, translating it with 
“inquiétude”, and argues that it is Hegel’s “most profound metaphysical intuition” and signifies his “greatest 
originality”.21 
Hegel’s philosophy of time sketched in the Jena Manuscripts for Koyré equates to a philosophy of man. And in 
a foreshadowing of Kojève’s later lectures on Hegel, notes the “Phenomenology of Spirit properly understood 
is an anthropology.”22 Repeating one of Heidegger’s phrases from Being and Time, Koyré says it is rather 
with the young Hegel’s “original” use of “Unruhe” that introduces the essential temporalising structure and 
paraphrases one of Hegel 1804-05 passages as: “The future is therefore the truth of the present”.23 But Koyré’s 
interpretation also shows how Hegel differentiates this human experience of time from the natural time of 
duration determined by life and death—that is, a subsistent “now [Jetzt]”, or the “nunc aeternitatis” where 
everything is already realised. Human time gives content and direction to that spatial “now” by negating the 
present, and altering the past.24 Koyré says:
Hegelian time is, above all, a human time, the time of man itself, of this strange being that “is what 
is not and not what it is”, the being who denies himself in what he is in favour [profit] of what he is 
not, or not yet, the being who, starting from the present, negates it, attempting to realise himself in 
the future, who lives for the future… and who ceases being the day when there is no longer a future25
This means for Koyré that “the Hegelian man is ‘Faustian.’” Even though this model of human temporality 
based on the movement of “Unruhe” makes intelligible the dialectic of time as an interaction between the 
future, present and past, infinity and finitude, but it also leads to a continual striving and pursuit for what is not 
here and now. For Hegel, such a kind of existence had tragic implications in the sense of leading to a life that is 
ultimately without satisfaction.26 But for there to be historicity and the possibility of historical consciousness, 
whereby there is a concrete sense of the future, Koyré argues there must be this sense of restlessness in this 
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negation of the present. However, Koyré recognises the limits of such an interpretation of Hegelian temporality 
and its over-emphasis, once he closely reads the 1805–06 lectures in Jenenser Realphilosophie II—where 
Hegel’s “System” begins imposing itself and the “rest” point of the present takes primacy. As he interprets it, 
Koyré sees that after 1805 Hegel began presenting time as derivative from space. Philip Grier has commented 
on Koyré’s interpretation, and observes that in Hegel’s Encyclopaedia version of the Philosophy of Nature 
(1830) this idea of a dualism between spirit and nature (time and space) no longer stands, and that from 1805 
onwards, the earlier rich speculations concerning the priority of the future over the present and past begin to 
disappear.27 Koyré cannot redeem Hegel’s concept of time presented in the later Encyclopaedia, because for 
him, it is a “time that is paralysed… [and hence] is no longer time”, “[t]his time, in effect, is space.”28 Koyré 
thus confirms at least the sentiment of Heidegger’s critique of Hegel’s concept of time, but only as it was 
presented in its systematic form in the Encyclopaedia, where there seems to be no primordial sense of time as 
directed towards a future horizon. 
Koyré refrained from postulating a dialectical solution to the problem of reconciliation between time and 
eternity, wherein the future could still hold its primacy, or at the least, a dynamic interaction with the past. In 
his last paragraph of ‘Hegel à Jena’, he illustrates the problem in way that would linger over the French reading 
of Hegel for decades to come:
… the dialectical character of time alone makes possible a philosophy of history, but at the same time 
the temporal character of the dialectic makes it impossible…The philosophy of history—and in that 
respect the philosophy of Hegel as a whole—the “system”—could only be a possibility if history has 
come to an end, if it has no more future; only if time can stop.
It is possible that Hegel believed in it [i.e. the end of time]. It is even possible that he believed not 
only that it was the essential condition for the system… but also that this essential condition had 
already been realized, that history had effectively ended, and therefore it was precisely because of 
that [reason] that he could—[or] had been able to—complete it.29 
Given there seems to be an irresolvable tension in Hegel’s thought between a dialectic of time (let us say, a 
philosophy of the future) riddled by uncertainty and a philosophy of history that demands universal judgment 
and closure, Koyré personally thinks such an end of time synthesis is “unforeseeable [imprévisible]”, and the 
System consequently, “eternally unfinished”. For him, in order for Spirit to “make the past present” as Absolute 
Knowledge, “it can only do so with the help of the future”, hence, an aporia emerges. Although he avoids 
speculating on a possible solution that could maintain a dynamic dialectic of the past and the future within a 
philosophical system, Koyré tends to simply accept the premise of the Hegelian-Heideggerian phenomenology 
of time. In fact, he repeatedly claims in the article Hegel’s philosophy is at its core primarily concerned with 
time rather than history and Absolute Knowledge, and furthermore, that “the Hegelian ‘system’ is dead, and 
really dead [bien mort].”30 Yet as Bruce Baugh and Joseph Flay argue, Koyré ends up “historicizing being” and 
affirming a “spurious infinite” with “no final term” so as to avoid the falling into a static system, even despite 
him recognising the essential importance of the System for Hegel’s philosophy as a whole.31 Grier on the other 
hand, finds the crucial point to be that “the end of history is a precondition for the system only given Koyré’s 
reading of the discarded ‘1802’ [1804–05] passage on time as if they were a crucial element of Hegel’s mature 
thought.”32 That is, Koyré assumes that Hegel had to “stop time”—for Absolute Knowledge could not co-exist 
with any uncertain future within it, for that would deny it the very premise of an Absolute standpoint. For 
Koyré, it was in a way the failure of the System that it could not solve this contradiction if the essence of time 
and the dialectic was an infinite and restless movement toward the future. Therefore, the task was left to his 
successor at the École Pratique des hautes études, Alexander Kojève, to resolve this issue, but as we will see, 
he did so by not questioning the Hegelian dualism Koyré had demarcated before him. 
THE END OF THE FUTURE: KOJÈVE’S RESOLUTION
As Koyré left Paris for the University of Cairo in the summer of 1933, he offered Kojève the job of leading 
RORY JEFFS
his Hegel Course at the École Pratique. Often overlooked is the continuity between Koyré’s Course and 
Kojève’s. For example, Kojève said that he saw his lectures as an “extension” of Koyré’s, and admitted to 
using Koyré’s method of interpretation”, most notably the “revelatory” comments on time, as the basis for 
his creative interpretation of the Phenomenology of Spirit.33 Unlike Koyré though, Kojève suspects then a 
paradoxical solution to understanding world history through a future-driven dialectic that comes to complete 
end. Kojève adheres to the Koyré line that a primacy of the future is integral to the movement of the dialectic 
of Spirit and human consciousness and progress, but goes further, by separating the two accounts of time in 
Hegel more so than Koyré had done. The time discussed in the Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Nature is simply 
treated by Kojève as non-dialectical—a process without end and teleology. Transposing Koyré’s analysis to 
the Phenomenology, he also claims the Hegelian account of time in this text relates to a human experience 
of time. However, for Kojève, the appearance of human time is not due to the “inquiétude” of being or an 
infinite restlessness that comes to emerge from through human beings. Instead, Kojève tackles the appearance 
of negativity along with Heidegger’s “angst” as emerging rather from a symptom of a desire for recognition 
from another human being. Kojève’s solution to the future-time problem though demands that human beings 
can no longer act as temporal beings once they mutually recognise each other as equals. In other words, there 
will be no need for more “future” projects to negate the present, when the state of world becomes universal 
and homogenous (i.e. “classless”) and governed according to principles of equal recognition and justice for all 
citizens. Missing from Koyré’s account of Hegelian time then was this shared form of historicity—the future 
as a collective “project” toward realising mutual recognition.
Kojève’s method of attaining and demonstrating this controversial end of history/end of time conclusion 
operates via a series of radical revisions and breaks from the Hegelian text that arguably isolates the importance 
of the later encyclopaedic works. In the context of the issue of the end of time, three strategic “corrections” 
stand out. The first one is a critique of Hegel’s dialectical monism (i.e. his conflation of natural and historical 
time). The second correction is Kojève’s interpretation of Hegelian “Concept [Begriff]” as “human” time. And 
the third is his idiosyncratic presentation of Absolute Spirit at the stage of Absolute Knowledge as embodied in 
the form of a “Book.”34 For Kojève, an ontological dualism between nature and humanity is necessary to correct 
Hegel’s monism and present his work as anthropology that can account for the non-natural aspects of the human 
world. Kojève argues that space ontologically precedes time, just as homogeneity precedes heterogeneity, and 
nature, man—simply because for Kojève negation itself is not primordial but secondary to Being (Sein). From 
this starting point, Kojève is quick to differentiate two temporalities—the biological and cosmological time 
analysed by natural scientists, mathematicians and physicists, and phenomenological or anthropological time—
the “human” time of the future.35 Hegel critiqued the sciences, in particular Newtonian physics, because he 
thought they were bound to a “spurious infinite” of the Understanding (Verstand), a “vain unrest of advancing 
beyond the limit to infinity”, but only finding a new limit each time it advances.36 Kojève though thinks with 
the advent of quantum physics in the early twentieth century through Heisenberg and Bohr that the sciences 
have become aware of their own limits, and further, philosophy has to concede that it too cannot explain the 
physical world of nature, especially in terms of an infinite spirit or dialectical totality.37 Unlike Koyré, Kojève 
seems to side with a systematic Hegelianism that is (to use a neologism) anthropologised—thinking he could 
unite his two times with an Absolute Concept and updated Hegelian System to articulate it—yet this in fact, 
remained an unfinished “project” for him after the War.38 He tended to believe that temporality and historicity 
could have no “objective-reality” if they were purely phenomenological possibilities and speculations of an 
eternally restless subject or individualised Dasein. To show how the phenomenon of time emerges out of social 
interaction, Kojève’s emphasises the struggle for recognition and its resulting master-slave dialectic. Through 
human beings risking their life for recognition of the other, the appearance of negation and time came to be 
as well as a second “historical” reality—but such an spontaneous emergence of time could be intelligible 
retrospectively as being an “error” or break rather than the sublation of nature—and we will discuss later 
how Malabou revises the meaning of what Kojeve’s means by “error” in terms of a teleological “accident”. 
Therefore, for Kojève, there is no primordial time of the future in nature or being as such as Koyré assumed; it 
is only thanks to the “error” of negation in the human being’s confrontation with death through an “other” that 
time and our awareness of finitude even emerged in the first place. Time then is a socialised or inter-subjective 
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phenomenon. And as he says, this means: 
Man is dialectical or historical (= free) movement revealing Being through Discourse only because 
he lives in the function of the future, which presents itself to him in the form of a project or as a ‘goal’ 
(Zweck) to be realized through action [sic] negate-ive of the given, and because he is not himself real 
as Man except to the extent that he creates himself through such action as a work (Werk).39 
Whilst Heidegger says there is only Dasein when there is a futural project happening that signifies being is 
an “issue” for it; with Kojève, the presence of Dasein presupposes a prior struggle for recognition. Hence, 
in Kojève’s terms, Hegel’s is the “[t]ime of conscious and voluntary action” of human beings towards 
realising future “projects”.40 We have a future as long as we can negate and transform the natural world or 
our given surroundings through labour or struggle and produce something “new” (non-natural) from them. 
To do so, requires, at the extreme, risking our lives and security, or labouring and developing a new “second” 
nature whose meaning can only be understood in terms of a socially constructed world shared with other 
human subjects. Kojève suggests that this anthropological time only appears or functions as a negation of 
an ontological homogeneity that underlines the human and social world and which exists prior to it and is 
essentially indifferent to it. Time then is not as absolute or infinite as Koyré had made it out to be. As it has to 
find support in an historical dialectic and give itself determinate form in our objective environment rather than 
relate to itself abstractly.
Following on from his “correction” of a dual ontology, Kojève makes another important adjustment to 
the Hegelian text, emphasising that the “Concept [Begriff] is Time”.41 Kojève cites two passages from the 
Phenomenology he thinks demonstrate the importance of such an equation of thought and time. The first one 
from the preface to the Phenomenology, where Hegel writes, “[a]s for Time… it is the empirically existing 
Concept itself.” Indeed, Kojève argues this quote sums up “Hegel’s whole philosophy”.42 The second quote 
is from the last chapter of the Phenomenology (‘Absolute Knowing’): “Time is the Concept itself, which is 
there.”43 And as Malabou notes herself, it was this last line in fact, that with the help of Heidegger “signed the 
death sentence” of Hegel.44 Kojève’s lectures at length on the problem of eternity and time to show how Hegel’s 
Absolute Knowledge serves as an entry point into “the last moment of Time”, which he says, is a “moment 
without a Future”.45 That is, time not in the proper historical sense, but as he will later add, cyclical or eternal 
time, and annotate in his footnote on the post-historical condition, “the eternal present”. It is at this point that 
Kojève must have believed he solved Koyré’s paradox of time and eternity in Hegel’s philosophy—but at what 
price? Once we accepted the circularity of the System of Knowledge and the identity of time and the Concept, 
then there appears to be no further projects on the horizon, but only a deeper understanding of the past. What 
Kojève conceals in this interpretation of Hegelian Absolute Knowledge is the ambiguity and instability of the 
temporal remainder that lies after this “appearance” of the assumed “last moment of Time”. In other words, 
he is simply silent about the prospect of future human activity and socio-political realisation of Wisdom after 
Hegel. If there were no such further possibilities, it is impossible to comprehend why any philosophy (let alone 
political action) could make sense after Hegel, and for that matter, Kojève’s interpretation—and any possibility 
for the “empirical-existence” of Self-Consciousness or Spirit.46 
Despite what may seem like a breach of common sense, Kojève in his last lectures in the Hegel Course ploughs 
on with his speculative vision stating, that “[i]n order to live in the Concept… it is necessary to live outside of 
Time in the eternal circle.”47 Yet he still has to explain how this historical or linear form of temporality directed 
towards the future can simply disappear and become irrelevant to how we experience and interpret the world. 
Time, as Hegel even says, will only be “annulled” once the Spirit has comprehended its “pure Concept”.48 
Therefore, as long as we have an “empty intuition” of historical time as something opposed to natural-biological 
time or transcendental time, we cannot strictly make the Concept equivalent to time. And as John Burbidge 
remarks with allusion to the Encyclopaedia, Hegel was never adamant about a strong connection between 
the concept and time that would neutralise the negativity and historicity of Spirit. For Burbidge, “the time is 
the concept as it is intuited rather than comprehended”.49 Hegel does say in the Philosophy of Nature, which 
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Heidegger cited, that the Concept is not in time or temporal, but that which has “the power over time”—i.e. 
the power to comprehend it (“begreifen”).50 For Kojève and Heidegger, it seems such a power requires the 
mastering of time and finitude by an eternal Spirit (Geist). Kojève’s way of resolving this dilemma of what 
happens after the realisation of Absolute Knowledge, and assumedly time comprehended, is to argue for a third 
“update” of the meaning of the System, by way of presenting the “Book” as the “empirical existence” of Spirit. 
The “Book” is loosely applied by Kojève to include the Phenomenology, the Logic, and the whole Hegelian 
Encyclopaedia; as well what he claims will be their endless commentary. The issue Kojève has to solve though 
is how will the “Book” no longer be re-temporalised, and how will it not be dependent on or destroyed by the 
actions of living and dying mortals who experience time toward an uncertain future? As Kojève explains it, 
“[t]he Time in which it [Book] lasts [dure] is thus natural or cosmic, but not historical or human. Certainly the 
Book, in order to be a Book and not just bound and stained paper must be read and understood by men.”51 What 
is confounding in this particular interpretation is that Kojève attempts to explain both the eternity of Absolute 
Knowledge in the form of the “Book” and the finitude and material existence of the human beings who read and 
re-write it as somehow co-existing on the same ontologically homogenous plane. But as he lets slip in another 
passage, finitude makes something of a comeback, as he admits, “I am only this Book to the extent that I write 
and publish it, in other words to the extent that it is still a future (or a project).”52
In such passages, Kojève seems to be really subtracting the essential inscrutability of the future that Heidegger 
revealed in Being and Time as confronting Dasein—and ended up holding sway in Koyré’s understanding of 
futurity. The new model of future (if we can still call it that) to be experienced by mutually-recognised citizens, 
is one that will exclude the possibility of radical transcendence, because it is assumed such citizens will accept 
their finitude and mortality without the restlessness that made time first possible. Once understood as a circular 
process, the repetition of writing and re-reading the “Book” becomes a cyclical movement, where there is “no 
true Future” in the abstract or transcendent sense that will introduce radical alterity or break with the past. 
And for Kojève, this means essentially that it is then no different from “the biological Time of Aristotle”.53 
The problem though with Kojève’s revaluation of Hegelian time is that the dual ontology he has worked with 
to get to the end of time conclusion ends up confirming in essence Heidegger’s initial critique—that Hegel’s 
concept of time from the Absolute standpoint was no less a metaphysics of presence than Aristotle’s. From this 
standpoint, the future of the human being in such an end-time scenario becomes trivialised or an afterthought. 
Kojève is either conspicuously silent or when he does make some kind of comment is contradictory on the 
shape of spirit at the end of history. Does the ontological difference between nature and spirit simply collapse? 
The so-called “disappearance of man” that Kojève speculates on is really death of a human and historical 
“Subject” that had the power of negativity over the external world, which he adds, will potentially be displaced 
by technology. There is an ambiguity over whether there is no more philosophical “reason” for humanity to 
change or negate the world and itself for a new future reality, or no actual ontological “possibility”. I would 
argue that Kojève’s pessimistic (even if given with his typical sense of wry irony) speculations of an end of 
time are misleading and remain ambiguous over what really lies on the horizon. For they remain inextricably 
determined by Koyré’s contrast between dialectic of time with its uncertain future and a philosophy of history 
that has everything sublated as pure past. Kojeve’s “solution” then is essentially the other side of this dualism. 
Hence, why Baugh says the difference between Koyré and Kojève’s responses to it is of “little consequence”.54 
But such a dualism and its resulting impasse led Kojève to annotate further in his well-cited 1962 footnote to 
the Introduction, and speculate from his personal observation of the “Japanese way of life”, with its cultural 
practice of snobbery for instance, implied there could be a continuation of negation in a “formal” mode as a 
way to resist “reanimalization” and the trappings of an “eternal present.” In order to remain human in this 
formal sense, he proposes, “it is necessary [doit] to remain a ‘Subject opposed to the Object’,” and as Derrida 
notes, given Kojève’s general lack of specificity, this implies some form of “promise” that “it is necessary [that 
there be] a future.”55 Like Koyré in one respect, Kojève at least showed some concern for the potential end 
of time scenario, and sought to save a formal sense of futurity, even if he could not foresee further significant 
historical changes on the horizon.
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BACK TO THE FUTURE: MALABOU’S PLASTICISATION OF HEGELIAN TIME 
Given that this was the Hegelian framework with which Koyré and Kojève initiated the French reading of 
Hegel, I think it is important to bring Catherine Malabou into this kind of discussion of the future in Hegel. 
By looking at it from a different angle, Malabou has offered us a welcomed relief to the problem that has 
arguably stuck with the French reading throughout the twentieth century. She seeks to avoid the “impasse” 
that Koyré and Kojève took the question of the Hegelian future into, which she describes as a “non-dialectical 
contradiction”—a contradiction that cannot reach any genuine resolution. Malabou argues that “the project 
they represent, as significant as it is, does not give us the means to respond to the question of the future of 
Hegel.” I note Malabou says here “the future of” rather the “future in” Hegel.” Although Koyré and Kojève 
found a neglected aspect of the future in Hegel’s Jena manuscripts—they “could only grant the future a priority 
over the other moments of time by suspending at once all future yet to come.”56 The challenge for Malabou then 
is to overcome the dualism between the “pan-tragicist” and “pan-logicist” readings that have plagued French 
Hegelianism since Koyré and Kojève, or what she calls herself the Hegelian “schizology”, which she traces 
back to Heidegger.57 Where Koyré and Kojève failed to suture such divisions within Hegel’s thought, Malabou 
attempts to make way for a dialectical middle ground between varying tendencies, and as she has recently 
explained her methodology, to find “a way to respond to the deconstruction and destruction of Hegelianism” 
that does not concede all points to Hegel’s opponents.58 It makes sense then that since her first book, The Future 
of Hegel, Malabou’s work has so far navigated the connections between Hegel, Heidegger, and Derrida. In her 
more recent book, Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing: Dialectic, Destruction, Deconstruction, she situates her 
thought “at the crossroads of two negative logics” that emerge from these three thinkers: “dialectical negativity” 
and “deconstructive negativity”.59 Therefore, despite Koyré and Kojève’s own revolutionary efforts at restoring 
Hegel’s legacy, Malabou asserts that the future in (and of) Hegel’s work “remains to be demonstrated and 
discovered.” When it comes to the question of time, Hegel has always been assumed as guilty as charged—for 
“[if we agree with] Heidegger, that Hegel never speaks about the future amounts to saying that Hegel does not 
have a future.” She contests this either-or scenario, and goes further than Koyré and Kojève in claiming that 
Hegel does have a future and identifies such a future temporality within the framework of the System itself—
where it had been declared dead, rather prematurely. 
Although Malabou rarely refers to Kojève, she begins her analysis with his adequation of Absolute Knowledge 
and the “end of time”—and asks, “[b]ut can there be any temporality which corresponds to this ‘end of time’ 
except time’s stasis in the congealed form of a perpetual present?”60 It is admirable that she begins with such a 
confronting question, and does not revert to Hegel’s Jena work and expound on the “inquiétude” of Spirit, but 
actually looks directly into the much-denigrated System and finds something she considers uniquely dialectical: 
namely, “plasticity.” Interestingly, Malabou treats the Encyclopaedia as the “ultimate expression of Hegelian 
thought”, and his discussion of time therein as the point in which Hegel questions rather the recapitulates to 
the ordinary conception of time. She cites from the very same passages of the ‘Mechanics’ in the Philosophy 
of Nature that Heidegger, Koyré, and Kojève do. She interprets Hegel’s meaning in such passages to be that 
“time itself is not what it is”—and rather than as an Aristotelian series, Hegel is really addressing time in such 
passages as a synthetic unity in the Kantian sense.61 Presenting the concept of plasticity in a Hegelian context 
helps Malabou reach a new definition of the future, distinct from the conventional definition of it as a “moment 
of time”, or another “now.” Malabou observes that Hegel’s work actually imparts to the reader to go beyond 
ordinary concepts of time and even live in two times at once. As she rightly reminds us, Absolute Knowledge 
is the synthesis of two temporalities, the Greek and the Christian. Kojève speculated at the end of his Hegel 
Course that the “Christian” time of the future would be re-absorbed by the Greek cyclical time at the stage of 
Absolute Knowledge. Malabou does not accept the conclusion that such an end of history would mean the end 
of time in its future sense, because for her, it “does not mark the end of all sudden and new appearances.”62 
Kojève’s rather blunt presentation of the end of history disavows the element of surprise that lies in waiting 
after Hegel at the Absolute standpoint. Yet Kojève would, like Hegel himself, concede in private after the 
Hegel Course that he could not “play the prophet” surely implies his account of an end of time as the end of 
uncertainty was a speculative proposition that the future would simply repeat the same dialectical logic of the 
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Malabou begins her analysis at this critical juncture, and attempts to get beyond the non-dialectical contradiction 
inherited from Koyré and Kojève. She says one reason why such a contradiction appeared was Hegel did not 
clearly reconcile enough the two meanings of the future in his System: 
… on the one hand, a chronological future, whose dynamic is the foundation of all historical 
development, and, on the other hand, a future as the logical “happening” of the concept, i.e. the 
concept in “the act-of-coming-to-itself (Zu-sich-selbst-kommen).”64 
Malabou’s inclusion of this second part of the Hegelian synthesis of time will be important for her theory of 
plasticity, as well distinguishing her understanding of Absolute Knowledge from the Kojevian and Koyrean 
interpretations of it as an enclosed “repetition” of an “eternal present”. Malabou also seeks to test the Hegelian 
dialectic itself, by seeing if she can put it to work through her theory of plasticity without the aid of historical 
negation. Plasticity has often been assumed to relate only “to the field of art”—namely, architecture and 
sculpture—the arts of form-making.65 But Hegel in Lectures on Aesthetics also describes “plasticity” in relation 
to historical “self-made” individuals such as Pericles and Plato who had “plastic and universal yet individual 
character”.66 Malabou cleverly adapts Hegel’s two concepts of plasticity in the Aesthetics, and adds a third, 
in “philosophical plasticity”—which is exemplified by the “philosophic attitude” and the transition from the 
“predicative proposition” to the “speculative [dialectical] proposition”. Hence, she raises one of Hegel’s little 
known concepts to the level of the Absolute and changing the function of Hegel’s philosophy in turn. For 
Malabou this plastic art of speculative dialectic requires the “activity-of-form,” that is, the power to “give-form” 
and “receive form”. Following Hegel’s lead, she does not believe in the possibility of radical transcendence 
or alterity, “the other of form but [rather] the other form.” For this reason, she thinks plasticity allows for 
the experience of an “alterity without transcendence”.67 Perhaps more importantly, given the implication of 
Kojève’s post-historical “cage”, plasticity could be a way to help us think of a “way out” where there appears 
to be no way out by reshaping the “cage” itself.68 
To help explain this new sense of the future in and of Hegel via plasticity, Malabou uses the syntagm, “voir 
venir,” translated as “to see (what is) coming”. She explains that this phrase implies, “at one and the same 
time, the state of ‘being sure what is coming’ and of ‘not knowing what is coming’.”69 “To see (what is) 
coming” is the ultimate “plastic concept”, because it involves simultaneously the interplay of form-giving and 
form-receiving. But it also means, as Derrida notes, that the future has the dual aspect of being determined 
according to teleological necessity, yet at the same time, experienced as an aleatory accident or “absolute 
surprise”.70 Therefore, Malabou is reflexively stretching the meaning of Hegelian Absolute Knowledge away 
from the hegemonic view of it is as closure, and invigorating it with a sense of philosophical encounter. 
Malabou explains “voir venir” as her own “idiomatic” interpretation of the “anticipatory structure” in the 
dialectical composition of time in Hegel. Furthermore, she distances plasticity from any Heideggerian temporal 
uncertainty, “[t]he future is not the absolute invisible, a subject of pure transcendence… nor is the future the 
absolutely visible… it frustrates any anticipation by its precipitation, its power to surprise.” In other words, 
we project ourselves into the future by “see[ing] without seeing” and “await[ing] without waiting”.71 But how 
plastic is the future in the sense of being a “surprise”? How open-ended is this form of Absolute Knowledge? 
Malabou refrains from asserting the movement of “voir venir” as a transcendental condition—separate from 
what it organises or a priori. This is why Malabou treats plasticity “strategically” rather than “thematically” 
for it is not something “external to the System”—to systematic thinking as such.72 Malabou’s strategy remains 
Hegelian in that it demands that we see necessity where we would be inclined to want to see contingency and 
discontinuity. Žižek recently reminded us that the common critique against Hegel in the twentieth century has 
been of the totalitarian thinker who justifies historical violence, and of “converting nonsense into sense, chaos 
into new order.” Žižek claims such a critique “has a grain of truth,” yet such extreme and contingent events 
of the last century actually call for such a Hegelian reading, which arguably Kojève had himself attempted to 
convey also with respect to revolutionary violence in the USSR.73 Malabou herself is not as explicit as Žižek 
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in her words, or perhaps as reductive as Kojève in her intention, but her use of the metaphor of the “atom 
bomb (Plastikbombe)” to illustrate the level of “surprise” plasticity brings and its potential destruction offers 
us insight into the speculative demand involved in the process she is outlining.74 Here Malabou recognizes the 
need for the systemising of events, and thus, she distance herself from the anti-Hegelian strategy of subverting 
such systematic thinking altogether —but the System she is positing is one that can never fully closes itself, 
or fixes its form for all eternity. In Malabou’s own words: “one never learns Hegel once and for all.” Here, she 
follows Bernard Bourgeois’ summation that the Absolute is “actualised in the final, concrete identity of the 
book’s reading”—a reading is always a personal engagement rather than a repetition of the text—and therefore, 
“to re-read the Encyclopaedia is to rewrite it.”75 
Whether Malabou’s plastic model of philosophy really differs from Kojève’s model of the “Book” depends on 
how we interpret the nature and impact of speculative philosophy itself. In ways, she has made the Hegelian 
enterprise more “supple” and humanly mortal and fragile than Kojève’s paradigm of the “Book”.76 With 
Malabou, the act of reading Hegel demands the rewriting, rather than simply repeating some doctrine, or 
“updating” it. What she finds missing in the French Hegelian reading hitherto is a revaluation of Hegel’s use of 
Aufhebung (sublation) as a “plastic operation” of speculative thought. Malabou finds the problem has been that 
no one in the French Hegelian tradition has put into practice an Aufhebung of the Aufhebung—the sublation of 
what has become via Hegelian interpretation itself the reification of sublation (i.e. end of time, end of history, 
the “Book”, etc.), where it is perceived as closure, re-appropriation, and the consummation of meaning.77 
But also, the Absolute requires as she cites Hegel, a “letting-go” or “abrogation” (“aufgeben”) of the self, by 
way of consciousness giving up its antithetical stance to the world once it “grasps itself as Absolute Spirit”. 
Interestingly, Kojève alludes to this process when he announced the “disappearance of man”—but as we noted 
earlier, was ambiguous over what it really meant.78 Malabou therefore continues the Hegelian idea that was 
carried through by Kojève of the subject-object unity, yet is able to differentiate what this speculative identity 
may entail from her predecessors. She does so by encouraging us to think of the Aufhebung as “[f]ar from 
enforcing a violent stoppage of the dialectic progress,” á la Kojève and Koyré’s “dialectical-suppression”, but 
rather implying “its metamorphosis”, one always “susceptible to [further] transformation.”79 If one were to fix 
the movement of Absolute Knowledge as purely reflective and retrospective and thus a closed circle, “there is 
no way to escape from the vicious circle”, where such a moment would either be an arbitrary intervention or 
question of chance. Such a closed circle account of Absolute Knowledge is no different to the classical standpoint 
of substance ontology—involving an immediate relationship with the world and things where one fails to be 
surprised. I would propose that Malabou might be overlooking the deeper reasons for Kojève and Koyré’s 
projection of a “closed circle” account of Absolute Knowledge that were not influenced directly by Heidegger. 
For instance, Kojève comes to this conclusion of the closed circle after comprehensively traversing the history 
of Western metaphysics (Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger) and its 
treatment of the relation between time and eternity. His main point that Hegel resolves the aporias afflicting the 
history of Western philosophy by accounting for its own historical genesis and subjectivity remains true with 
Malabou’s rendering of the System as more plastic, reflexive and synthetic compared to previous philosophy. 
But I think there is more than a battle here over how to interpret the metaphor of the circle of Hegel’s Absolute 
Knowledge.80 Although, Kojève’s post-war writings remained open to historical contingencies and continued 
to address and explain geo-political changes around the world, he did not really see in such contingencies any 
real “surprise” that breached a Hegelian logic, but rather an unfolding whose structure he could subsume under 
the categories of universality and homogeneity and the principle of mutual recognition. 
Key to Malabou’s way of distancing herself from Kojève’s problematic of producing an enclosing discourse is 
her “plastic” understanding of post-Hegelian hermeneutics. For Kojève (as cited at the beginning of the article), 
Hegelian hermeneutics had a political significance. As one was not a neutral commentator when one engaged 
in Hegel’s writings, one’s interpretation would always uncover one’s general ideological disposition, whether 
as a “Left” (radical) or “Right” (conservative) Hegelian, or even “anti” Hegelian (liberal “relativist”). For 
Malabou, the differences in Hegelian interpretations are due primarily to the plasticity constitutive of the act of 
reading itself—the multiplicity of form-giving and receiving, which Hegel’s work in particular lends itself to in 
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spades. Hence, why Malabou takes Hegel’s phrase to “philosophise in one’s idiom” seriously—for this is what 
ensures the plasticity of Absolute Knowledge. From the act of reading and interpreting in one’s idiom is like 
accessing the universal through one’s particularity.81 For Malabou, there is no superior or meta-“idiom”, or for 
that matter, a final “objective-reality” that could settle an interpretative discussion. Plasticity stands in then for 
the real base structure of society, unlike Kojève’s Marxist-influenced model of action and work, where “verbal” 
dialectics of interpretation were considered its super-structure. Therefore, Malabou potentially exposes the 
process of plasticity to the fate of an open-ended “spurious infinite”, where the “excess of the future over the 
future” can never fully sublated or mastered, and that no amount of objective-reality or assumed harmonious 
state of social relations could overcome the plasticity of Spirit.82 On this point, the only basis Malabou provides 
from the Hegelian text is in the 1831 preface to the Science of Logic concerning “plastic discourse”.83 This 
idiomatic hermeneutic highlighted by Malabou is made possible by Hegel’s view that there is no superior 
language for speculative philosophy as every language participates in it. Without this clause, Malabou is aware 
of the objection that such a model of reading may be “nothing but simple repetition, with no invention at all”—
that Kojève himself risked suggesting due to his post-historical model of pure stasis.84 Furthermore, without 
perhaps knowing it, Malabou is heeding Kojève’s wager, more so than he had—that new “active” and engaged 
readings will decide Hegel’s future, but not in the sense of once and for all or without “surprise”. Important 
to Malabou’s concept of plasticity is its openness to criticisms and its continual re-invention. This is the point 
where her idea of the future differentiates from the others in that she reflexively discusses plasticity in a way 
that risks its own transformation. Jean-Paul Martinon argues that Malabou’s concept of plasticity cannot be 
grasped with a strict method of critique or even commentary, but only “set it in another context” by “testing” it 
so to speak, and seeing if it is “truly plastic”.85 Plasticity is not simply reducible to a single method or strategy 
of reading or acting, be it normative, or deconstructive. 
I think Malabou has noted something philosophically important about the future—the formal aspect of it—it 
is dependent upon this act of “giving form” to what is coming. Philosophy itself is a dialogue of giving form 
to thought (Denkformen) and receiving it and re-forming, and so on.86 Philosophical readings create “new 
meanings” of propositions by the simple production of new propositions in return. To ask whether Hegel really 
intended such a meaning and implication of plasticity in his work might miss the point of Malabou’s strategy 
here—it seems she believes this is the only way to save Hegel and the future in its dialectical sense from 
the Heideggerian and deconstructive counter-strategies. Her strategy is not to save the future in Heidegger’s 
self-understanding of it as perhaps Koyré arguably tried, nor follow Kojève attempt to disprove that “history 
refuted Hegelianism”, but tarry with the forces unleashed by Heideggerian “destruktion” and after the linguistic 
turn, Derridean deconstruction, and to propose that they have not “refuted” the core of Hegelian plasticity. 
However, despite its initial advantages, there is a problem with taking this path toward a Hegelian plasticity 
too far. Although, Malabou questions the “arbitrary exegesis” that anything goes with interpretation and tries to 
differentiate plasticity from elasticity, it is difficult to pinpoint exactly what makes a good “plastic” (speculative) 
reading here, especially when knowing or presupposing a “meta”-plastic form is barred. There is a sense in her 
analysis that the content and context involved in interpretations is secondary to the plastic and transformative 
process of the form received and returned. With Kojève’s analysis, there was at least, before his late period, 
a view that one should not interpret or read Hegel out of “purely literary interest”, but that one’s reading of 
Hegel should determine the basis of a form of praxis or ideological struggle that could directly influence and 
change our political-social relations, by way of creating new “objectivications” of mutual recognition.87 But 
for Malabou, the value of reading Hegel seems to chiefly lie in making possible the eternal return of the “gift” 
of plasticity itself, rather than as Kojève would have it, in realising or giving universal objectivity to one’s 
interpretation and political ideal via collective action. The implication would be to maintain a plurality of 
meaning continues and arguably make Kojève’s “future of the world” an unending process and end in-itself. 
Malabou’s theory of plasticity serves to save both a sense of finitude and teleology to Hegel’s thinking of the 
future, yet she does so in a way that implies no form of thought or life is immune enough to its own radical 
transformation. It is not entirely clear then whether she has saved plasticity from exposure to indeterminacy, or 
Derrida’s own “relève” of a “Hegelianism without reserve”.88 It is of arguable significance that in her writings 
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published after The Future of Hegel, she has turned toward a more materialist theory of plasticity based in the 
biological and neurological sphere, rather than in relations between labour and capital. Whether this strategy 
signifies a retreat or reluctance in dealing with the specificity involved and difficulty of changing the social and 
political forms of mediation is open to debate. Nevertheless, Malabou considers her project one that concerns 
pursuing the revolutionary potential of plasticity. However, plasticity is still presented as a double-edge sword, 
which Malabou is to her credit aware of—where the assumed Hegelian “Sunday of Life” that brings plasticity 
to the surface, risks the “peril of” leaving us still in the shadow of Kojève’s post-historical condition that struck 
figures before her from Georges Bataille to Giorgio Agamben. As she ends her book, she reflects on this issue 
of risk in the plastic (post-Hegelian) age: 
[T]he major problem of our time is in fact the arrival of free time. Technological simplification, the 
shortening of distances … bring about a state where there is nothing more to do. The most sterile 
aspect of the future lies in unemployment, both economic and metaphysical, which it promises. 
But this promise is also a promise of novelty, a promise that there are forms of life which must be 
invented.89
The issue of whether the emergence of “free time” in modernity converts into new political tasks or humanised 
“projects” was one Kojève briefly ruminated on just after the War, and noted its philosophical importance for 
both Aristotle and Marx.90 But does plasticity really deliver socio-historical changes that enhance the freedom 
of modern life in the public realm via public institutions or practices? How can Malabou transition from the 
plasticity in Hegel’s work with its remnant of future temporality to a specific form of politics or resistance that 
attempts to give the future a new and more singular direction as well as form? One concern is how it insures 
itself against de-politicisation or being assimilated into the self-making industries of late capitalism. But it is 
Malabou’s chapter on Hegel’s anthropology, drawn from the Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Mind rather than 
Koyré and Kojève’s resource the Phenomenology, which holds an important place in her overall theory of 
plasticity and connecting to the real everyday lives of people. For it is in her interpretation of Hegel’s later 
anthropology that she is better able to relate plasticity to concrete aspects of a human condition. Here the 
analysis focuses on the re-duplication of “habit” as the human being’s capacity for bildung, or formation of a 
“second nature” that distinguishes it from the another object in the natural world.91 Whilst Kojève considered 
the question of humanity’s emergence from nature to be “undeducible” in naturalistic terms, Malabou presents 
a more robust materialist anthropology than Kojève’s rather “spiritual” dialectic of anthropogenesis, which 
ended up in anthropological formalism and symbolic re-enactment of negation. Unlike his late gesture of 
formal negation as a way out of biological reductionism(s) the “timeless” future may bring, Malabou believes 
life after Hegel is not a repetition of the same, nor a process of “reanimalization” or simple re-naturalisation, 
but a life exemplified by a free and self-conscious life of habit. She has in mind here habits that enable the 
“mechanism of self-feeling”—the reduplication of human negativity (“non-biological desire”) in symbolic 
yet plastic practices and projects, which with Aristotelian inspiration involve the “work of the art of the soul.” 
Life understood in terms of plasticity is neither a passive animalistic life of consumption, nor an active life of 
a “sovereign” subject detached from the natural world without need of substitution. Plasticity negotiates the 
interaction between the symbolic and the natural worlds. Malabou argues, “what is exemplary in man is less 
human-ness than his status as an insistent accident.” Humans are like “plastic individuals,” giving presence to 
a singularity that converts accidents or improvisations into “an essence a posteriori”.92 The contingent becomes 
essential—the “accident” of our evolutionary development our unique strength. Following the existential terms 
that preoccupied Koyré and Kojève, Malabou reappraises the view that for Hegel human beings have no fixed 
or eternal substance—the Hegelian human is one concerned with habit-creation. This revaluation of habit 
provides a way of understanding the need to keep the “speculative clock alive” and the sense of time as future-
directed (“voir venir”). For without the activities our capacity for habit render and shape in us, we could “not 
know how to tell time” or really be alive and know ourselves with a strong sense of finitude, and the work of 
Spirit throughout history would risk becoming undone.93 Even though this aspect of Malabou’s consideration of 
plasticity in everyday life is significant, how one preserves the practice and culture of habit from being reduced 
to “technological simplification” and losing its vitality still poses a challenge to the dialectic of plasticity.
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Besides these considerations, Malabou’s The Future of Hegel has at least opened up the debate on what the 
future means in Hegel, and not let post-war schisms undermine it or foreclose its discussion. The value of her 
book lies not just in its risk of giving Hegel another chance, but also freeing the very conditions of Hegelian 
temporality from the simple terms of negation and otherness that were arguably over-emphasised by Koyré 
and Kojève. But as for the applications of a Hegelian plasticity in a socio-historical context, further discussion 
or “testing” is needed over the possible implications. Not to say Malabou’s analysis could not be transposed 
into political, social, or ethical theory—but the way in which plasticity would be adopted in such a case I think 
would be arguably more complex than the connections she has shown between plasticity and philosophy and 
reading. Malabou herself has considered the issue of the application of plasticity since the publication of The 
Future of Hegel and delved into the field of neuroscience to discuss plasticity in more detail—noting in her 
observations that Hegel’s System is not essentially different from the systems of neurobiology. In part, this 
recent part of her work again raises the significance of the dynamic role of the biological element in the re-
duplication of our “second” (humanised and temporal) nature. Yet it is still difficult to know how plasticity 
can actually resist the logic of late capitalism given that one could argue it reflects the process of capital and 
commodification rather than being distorted by it. In her book on neuroscience, What Should We Do with Our 
Brain? Malabou recognises the pitfalls of a “neuronal ideology of flexibility,” which she knows enough not 
to mistake for a political basis for resistance. But she remains committed to distinguishing plasticity from 
flexibility and elasticity, by arguing that it holds a tension and turbulence that can resist change as well as will 
it, and for this reason, provide an “emancipatory political understanding”.94 She has, I would argue, made her 
speculative wager on neurology to help plasticity overcome both the stalemates of traditional Hegelianism(s) 
and their deconstruction—but one wonders if it will deliver in actuality the revolutionary potential she seeks. 
Žižek is one commentator who has kept an eye on the political implications of plasticity. Awakened by the 
possibility of a dialectical union between materialism and neuroscience, Žižek poses an important response to 
Malabou and with it the “cognitivist Hegel” reading: 
… in terms of plasticity, do we mean by this merely a capacity for infinite accommodation to the 
needs and conditions given in advance by our environs—in which we can get the infinitely adaptable 
“protean self”—or do we mean a Self capable of “negativity,” of resisting and subverting the pressures 
of its environs, of breaking out of “self-maintenance” whose ideal is to maintain one’s homeostasis.95 
Even if Malabou rejects the dichotomy between reductionist arguments of natural science and anti-reductionist 
ones from philosophy, she may still be speculating and investing too much in the brain and presupposing there 
is an untapped immanent excess there or dialectical potential that awaits its own release.96 As Derrida would 
say there is an essential “Undecidability” in the framework of Malabou’s speculative oeuvre, which for better 
or worse, resists anticipating its own implications.97 She frames the whole question of the future as one involves 
a risk of thinking and being open to possibility and transformation. Although she circumvents the “impasse” of 
the end of time confronted by Koyré and Kojève, it is another question whether a theory of plasticity is enough 
to reinvigorate the historical or political meaning of the future to the point of compelling us to take the risk of 
projecting ourselves into it through action. What this implies is that the speculation of the future in and of Hegel 
needs to continue—but transitioning from the question of that there is a future to what do we want the future 
to be, and how will it be realised.
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